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THE EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1949:
EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT
PA-uL H. SihVFRSToNB, t
Export controls are enforced by means of a variety of sanctions, among them
the denial of trading privileges, crimtinal prosecutim, and the confiscation
of goods illegally traded. But such sanctions, although they may deter
violation of United States law, cmnot bring back goods after they have
passed into the domain of a foreign nation. This Article surveys the legal
means available to prevent such goods from reaching their illegal destinations,
and examnhes the defenses available to persons who, by acting in compliance
with United States laz, subject themselves to breach of contract suits in
foreign courts.
Legislative enactments affecting transactions which take place be-
yond the borders of the enacting nation inevitably raise unique and
perplexing problems of enforcement. Since the power to apply sanctions
is a function of sovereignty,' serious questions of policy and ethics, as
well as of law, are bound to arise when one nation seeks to reach into
the jurisdiction of another nation and dictate the legal consequences
which are to be attached, by the courts of the nation having jurisdiction,
to acts which occur there. Often the effect of such legislation is to
produce situations where an act by a person is "legal" in his own
country, where it is performed, and yet is within the purview of the
legislation of a foreign state which makes it "illegal."
The Export Control Act of 1949 2 is an example of this type of
legislation in that it renders subject to the regulations promulgated
t Member of the New York Bar; A.B., 1953, Yale University; LL.B., 1956, Har-
yard University.
1. See STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1931).
2. 63 Stat. 7, 50 U.S.C. App. §§2021-32 (1952). The 1949 legislation was in-
tended to continue controls then in effect without substantive change. Controls were
first authorized in 1940 in regard to munitions and similar materials essential to the
defense effort, and extended in 1942 to all commodities. Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 508,
§ 6, 54 Stat. 714; Act of June 30, 1942, ch. 461, 56 Stat 463. Always intended to be
only temporary, the 1940 act was successively extended in 1944, 1945, 1946 and 1947.
Act of July 1, 1944, ch. 360, 58 Stat 671; Act of June 30, 1945, ch. 205, 59 Stat. 270;
Act of May 23, 1946, ch. 269, 60 Stat. 215; Act of June 30, 1947, ch. 184, § 1, 61 Stat.
214; Second Decontrol Act of 1947, ch. 248, § 4, 61 Stat. 323. Scarcity of certain
goods in the world markets made continuance of controls necessary in order to prevent
a drain of such goods from our more plentiful supplies with its consequential infla-
tionary trend. It was envisaged that remaining controls would soon disappear at
the time of re-enactment in 1949. S. REP. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1949).
But national security and foreign policy, especially following the outbreak of the
Korean war, were new and compelling reasons for extending the present act in 1951,
1953, 1956 and again in 1958. Act of May 16, 1951, ch. 83, 65 Stat. 43; Act of June 16,
1953, ch. 116, 67 Stat. 62; Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 473, § 1, 70 Stat. 407; Pub. L.
No. 466, 72 Stat. 220 (U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (July 20, 1958)). See H.R.
R n. No. 318. 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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under it all persons wherever situated. Under its provisions exports
of scarce materials are controlled both from the economic standpoint-
short supply and the consequent inflationary effect of foreign demand;
and the security standpoint-autarchy and self-sufficiency in strategic
resources not available in sufficiently large quantities. These are both
domestic policies aimed primarily at conditions within the United States.
Controls are also directed at conditions outside the country as an instru-
ment of foreign policy. This is exemplified by the restriction on export
of certain strategic or military items to the Soviet bloc or to other
countries which it is felt, if permitted, would be detrimental to the
foreign policy program of this country.3 This latter motive became
so strong that it brought legislation directing the President to enlist
the cooperation of other nations in enacting controls on trade with the
Soviet bloc to parallel those of the United States. The benefits of the
various economic and military aid programs were to be withheld from
noncooperating nations.4
This Article will discuss the operation of the act with a view
toward demonstrating its extraterritorial effects and examining attempts
to gain compliance with its provisions. Attention will also be given to
the perplexing situation in which an exporter, carrier, or American
consignee, who, by complying with the mandates of the act and ad-
ministrative regulations thereunder, breaches his contract with a third
party. The question arises whether he may successfully raise the duty
to comply with American law as a defense to a suit in a foreign forum
for that breach.
I. OPERATION OF THE EXPORT CONTROL ACT
The Export Control Act of 1949 is drawn in very broad terms, the
President being authorized to "prohibit or curtail the exportation from
the United States . . of any articles . . . except under such
rules as he shall prescribe." ' Export controls are presently administered
by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Foreign Commerce, the
most recent of a series of agencies which have exercised this function.
Originally these functions were in the Department of State.
Under the present arrangement all exportations of any kind from
the United States are prohibited unless the Bureau has either issued a
license or established a general license for such shipments." General
3. Section 2, 63 Stat. 7 (1949), 50 U.S.C. Ai'z. §2022 (1952).
4. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), ch. 575, 65
Stat 644, 22 U.S.C. § 1611-13c (1952).
5. Section 3(a), 63 Stat. 7 (1949), 50 U.S.C. Ap'. §202 3(a) (1953).
6. 15 C.F.R. § 370.2 (1957) (all'references to 15 C.F.R. are to the 1957 edition
unless otherwise noted). This does not apply to shipments to Canada.
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licenses have been established for the exportation of many types of
commodities to certain destinations.7 A validated license " is required
for exportation of commodities grouped together in the regulations as
the "Positive List." ' Those exportations not falling within a general
license category and not listed in the Positive List also require a
validated license.' 0
Carriers are prohibited from delivering goods to destinations other
than those listed in the license or in the exporter's declaration which
is required for all exportations, and upon delivery of the goods must
obtain from the recipient a bill of lading with the destination control
statement " included. The consignee and the carrier are prohibited
from diverting the goods described in the bill of lading from the named
country or destination. The Bureau may order a carrier to return the
shipment to the United States or unload it in bond at a port of call
if it believes a violation of law is about to occur.'
Constitutionality
Under the prevailing view engaging in export trade from the
United States is a privilege and not a right. Regulation of the exporta-
tion of arms and other war materiel is inherent in the powers of the
executive in its capacity to carry on the foreign relations of the United
7. 15 C.F.R. § 371.1. No application is filed and no document is issued under
a general license. A general license authorizing export to the Soviet bloc of certain
listed commodities, mostly consumer goods, was set up in 1956, and further easing
of controls on Soviet-American trade is predicted. 15 C.F.1. § 371.24 (Supp. 1958).
See Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1958, p. 1, col. 1. Controls on export to Poland were
relaxed further on August 28, 1957. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1957, p. 39, col. 3; see
22 Fed. Reg. 7277 (1957).
8. To obtain a validated license, the applicant must be an exporter subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. He must list the quantity, description, price and
proposed end-use of the goods together with the names of all parties interested in
the transaction. 15 C.F.R. § 372. Similar information is listed in the Shipper's
Export Declaration, required for all exportations.
9. 15 C.F.R. §§ 372.3, 399.1. The Positive List contains both commodities which
are of a highly strategic nature and those excessive export of which would cause
domestic scarcity. However, the balance is very much on the side of the former.
Only eight commodity categories were controlled for reasons of short supply in
December 1955. SECRxrARY OF CoMmRmcE, 34TH REPORT oN ExPoRT CONTROL 24
(1956).
10. 15 C.F.R. §372.3.
11. 15 C.F.R. § 379.10(c) (1) (Supp. 1958). Either of the following statements
must appear: "These commodities licensed by the United States for ultimate des-
tination (name of country). Diversion contrary to United States law prohibited."
Id. § 379.10(c) (1) (i). "United States law prohibits disposition of these commodities
to the Soviet bloc, Communist China, North Korea, Macao, Hong Kong or Com-
munist controlled areas of Viet Nam and Laos, unless otherwise authorized by the
United States." Id. § 379.10(c) (1) (iii).
12. 15 C.F.R. § 379.11.
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States.3 The constitutionality of present controls was challenged in
two wartime cases on the ground of an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the executive. In United States v. Rosenberg '
the court of appeals distinguished earlier decisions holding unconstitu-
tional broad delegations of power on the ground of "the traditional
dominance of the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs." "
However, this ground was unnecessary to the decision, the court holding
the statute did in fact set a sufficiently definite standard. A district
court decision, United States v. Bareno,'0 appearing before the decision
on appeal in the previous case, upheld constitutionality in terms of a
reasonable basis for the broader delegation. "In the present war, there
is scarcely a thing normally in common civilian use which is not needed
for the prosecution of the War. This has never been true in previous
wars." 17 The President's power to carry on foreign relations includes
the power to regulate the exportation of all goods.
Procedure
The privilege of engaging in export transactions from the United
States may be denied to any person violating the act or regulations
solely by administrative action.' 8 As with other temporary legislation,
the functions exercised under the act have been specifically excluded
from the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act.19 There is no
requirement that administrative proceedings be brought within a par-
ticular time: proceedings may be reopened "at any time" for hearing
new evidence.20  The Bureau has reopened cases several months after
the previous "final" determination.21
13. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
14. 150 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 752 (1945).
15. 150 F.2d at 790.
16. 50 F. Supp. 520 (D. Md. 1943).
17. Id. at 525.
18. 15 C.F.R. § 382.1. It should also be noted that all licenses are subject to
revision, suspension or revocation by the Bureau without notice. Id. § 370.2 (c). In
addition to the administrative procedure, any respondent may, by letter, be denied
privileges in regard to validated licenses, 15 C.F.R. § 382.11 (a), or while under investi-
gation, may be denied all export privileges for up to thirty days without prior hearing
or notice. Id. § 382.11(b) ; London Export Corp., 21 Fed. Reg. 1941, 3765 (1956)
(all administrative cases herein cited to Fed. Reg. were decided by the Bureau of
Foreign Commerce). See Zemanek & Co., 20 Fed. Reg. 7383 (1955), 21 Fed. Reg.
3610 (1956) (further violation while original denial order in effect).
19. Section 7, 63 Stat. 7 (1949), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2027 (1953) (except as to
the requirement of publication of regulations and orders in the Federal Register).
See also S. Rxi,. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
20. 15 C.F.R. § 382.12; Italian Nova Works, 20 Fed. Reg. 775 (1955).
21. Union Europenne de Produits Chimiques, 21 Fed. Reg. 4322 (1956) (denial
of privileges extended from one year to duration of controls).
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Any person against whom proceedings are initiated is entitled to a
hearing conducted by a compliance commissioner appointed by the
Bureau. His findings are reviewed by the Director of Export Supply
who determines the disposition of the case.' The respondent may
appeal an order denying him privileges to the Appeals Board of the
Department of Commerce,23 upon the ground, "1) that the findings of
violation are not supported by any substantial evidence, 2) that
prejudicial error of law was committed, or 3) that the provisions of
the order are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." 24 Appeals
may also be made on broader grounds of exceptional hardship or
improper discrimination. Taking an appeal does not stay the effect of
a denial order. The decision of the Appeals Board is to be final. 6
Persons failing to answer written interrogatories may be denied
export privileges "indefinitely." 2 Temporary denial orders are
not usually issued.28 However, where the respondent is later found to
have violated the law, the suspension period often runs retroactively
from the date of the first temporary denial order.29
Enforcement
Sanctions available to the Bureau extend to the permanent denial
of the privilege of exporting or receiving goods or otherwise participat-
ing in the exportation of any commodity from the United States to any
foreign destination.3 ° In practice discretion is used to prescribe lesser
penalties by limiting the restriction to validated licenses only,31 or to
particular commodities,32 or lessening the term of proscription,' and
in some instances suspending the denial order pending good behavior.
3 4
22. 15 C.F.R. § 382.
23. The Appeals Board is not part of the Bureau of Foreign Commerce. Its
decisions are no longer printed in the Federal Register under that heading, but under
"Department of Commerce." See 15 C.F.R. §383.1(d).
24. Id. § 382.13.
25. Id. § 383.1(e). These grounds also apply to a refusal to grant a validated
license.
26. Id. §382.13(d).
27. 15 C.F.R. § 382.15. See M. Newmark & Co., 21 Fed. Reg. 2851 (1956).
28. American Levant Industrial Co., 22 Fed. Reg. 290 (1957). But see case of
Americauto, where the original temporary denial order, 21 Fed. Reg. 7703 (1956),
was successively extended, 21 Fed. Reg. 9749 (1956), 22 Fed. Reg. 643, 868, 1649
(1957). See note 18 supra.
29. Adolf Duhme, 21 Fed. Reg. 5944 (1956).
30. 15 C.F.R. § 382.1. The ban may extend to Canada even though exportations
to Canada do not require general or validated export licenses. Id. § 370.2 (a) (1).
31. Charles Y. Rofe, 18 Fed. Reg. 6365 (1953), privileges conditionally restored,
19 Fed. Reg. 6885 (1954).
32. Standard Int'l Corp., 19 Fed. Reg. 4429 (1954).
33. See, e.g., Joachim Wilhelm Krugel, 18 Fed. Reg. 5521 (1953); E. A. Bro-
mund Co., 14 Fed. Reg. 1689 (1949).
34. Willys-Overland Export Co., 20 Fed. Reg. 4191 (1955).
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The suspension has sometimes been delayed so as not to penalize those
with whom the respondent has existing obligations.35 The respondent
may be denied privileges for the "duration of export controls," but is
permitted to apply for reinstatement after a period of time."6 Denial
of privileges for the "duration" is in effect permanent in the light of
the repeated extension of controls, and it has been so described3 7  A
list of all individuals and firms who are currently subject to denial orders
is printed in the regulations.38
Criminal prosecution is also available as a remedy against those
violating the act or regulations. Numerous persons and firms have
been convicted and fined or sentenced to imprisonment.39 Such con-
victions are usually for failing to give complete information in applica-
tions for export licenses, or for conspiracy to violate the export control
laws.40  Prosecutions must be brought within five years.'
A third remedy available to the Government is forfeiture proceed-
ings. The regulations provide that goods "attempted to be, or being,
or intended to be, or which have been" exported from the United States
in violation of these laws are subject to seizure.' Comparatively few
cases of forfeiture in this area are reported.' The Export Control
35. Franz Hanke, 19 Fed. Reg. 2432 (1954).
36. Theodore E. Kedros, 22 Fed. Reg. 3424 (1957), revoking 15 Fed. Reg. 4879,
8866 (1950) ; Paul Wormser & Co., 19 Fed. Reg. 5064 (1954) (previous petition for
revocation denied).
37. "The Klaasen Co. had been permanently denied all export privileges." Union
Europ~enne de Produits Chimiques, 20 Fed. Reg. 9469 (1955), 21 Fed. Reg. 4322
(1956).
38. 15 C.F.R. § 382.51.
39. See, Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking & Currency on H.R.
4882, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 18-20 (1953).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Leviton, 193 F2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 946 (1952) ; United States v. Rosenberg, 150 F2d 788 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 752 (1945) ; United States v. Kertess, 139 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 795 (1944).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (Supp. V, 1958).
42. 15 C.F.R. § 381.1(b). Although goods "intended to be" exported may be
seized, the courts have construed this narrowly since 1945 to mean illegal exportations
presently imminent. United States v. Moreno, 182 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1950). Goods
which have been exported once illegally are subject to seizure if they are returned
to United States territory, even if only in transit. Distribuidora Exclusiva, S.A.,
15 Fed. Reg. 591 (1950). Recently goods were exported, apparently validly, but the
export licenses were revoked, and the Bureau of Foreign Commerce ordered the
carrier to return the goods to the United States. They were seized after being landed
in New York, and forfeiture proceedings were brought. United States v. Borax,
11,020 Bags, 137 F. Supp. 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1955,
p. 30, col. 8.
The regulations also provide for seizure of the carrier involved in illegal ex-
portations. Forfeiture may be had even though the owner is completely innocent of
wrongdoing, United States v. Morachis, 154 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1946), and even
though the value of the contrabrand is wholly out of proportion to that of the carrier,
United States v. One 1942 Chevrolet Truck, 164 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1947).
43. In some years the number of forfeiture proceedings has been considerable.
Two hundred thirty-three cases were brought in 1953, while only twenty-eight were
brought in 1954. DOUGLAS, WE TrHE JUDGES 91 (1956).
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Act itself makes no provision for forfeiture of goods; such actions are
brought under the Espionage Act." Proceedings of this nature are
effective in preventing violations. Generally, people will not risk losing
their property by confiscation unless there is something to make it very
much worth their while. But the jurisdiction of the court can take
hold only when the goods are actually present; after the goods have
been exported, United States courts are powerless to order forfeiture
unless by some fortuitous circumstance the goods return.
Extraterritorial Administrative Controls
By means of administrative regulations United States authorities
attempt to control movement of goods outside the United States. Goods
shipped under general license may be transshipped to another destina-
tion only if the goods could have been shipped there directly from the
United States under such general license." Another provision makes
it unlawful knowingly to "export, dispose of, divert, transship or reex-
port" goods in violation of any export control document or prior repre-
sentation.4 6 While this section applies to persons in the United States, it
also by its very terms applies to persons and goods outside the United
States.
Another set of regulations, known as Transaction Controls, makes
it unlawful for any person situated in the United States to ship
Positive List commodities from one foreign country to another if they
could not have been so shipped directly from the United States.
Goods moving through the United States to the Soviet bloc are treated
as goods originating in the United States.48
American flag vessels and aircraft are prohibited from carrying
to Hong Kong or Macao any strategic or war materiel unless a validated
license has been issued, and are absolutely prohibited from calling at
ports controlled by Communist China.49 The order includes shipments
not originating in the United States and purports to relieve such
carriers from liability for breach of contract for nondelivery, even
where held liable by court order. 0 However, a foreign court holding
44. 40 Stat. 223 (1917), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V, 1958); United
States v. Twenty-one Lbs. 8 Oz. of Platinum, 147 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1945).
45. 15 C.F.R. § 371.4 (Supp. 1958) (general license); id. § 372.12 (validated
license).
46. 15 C.F.R. § 381.6.
47. 31 C.F.R. § 505 (Supp. 1958). This regulation went into effect in 1953.
48. 15 C.F.R. § 371.9(a) (1) (iii) (Supp. 1958).
49. 32A C.F.R. 209, regs. T-1, T-2 (1958).
50. See Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 818, 50 U.S.C. Amp. § 2157
(1952).
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a carrier liable for nondelivery under this order ordinarily would not
find itself bound by this last provision. 1
II. ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS: DENIAL OF THE EXPORT PRIVILEGE
The most important, and presently most effective, remedy available
to the United States Government in cases of violations of American
export controls by persons outside the jurisdiction of the United States
is the denial of the right to engage in export transactions originating in
the United States.52  The regulations permit administrative action
against "any person," 's it being unlawful for "any person, whether or
not situated in the United States" to make misrepresentations to, or
conceal material facts from, the Bureau.54 Thus, by their terms such
provisions can apply to acts occurring outside the United States,
especially in cases of transshipment or re-exportation of goods.
55
Denial orders are generally couched in broad terms, purporting to
exclude the named respondents, as well as any individuals or firms
associated with or controlled by them, from participating in any manner
in any export transaction from the United States. This includes buying
or selling goods which have been exported from the United States, and
dealing with other foreign firms in relation to goods of United States
origin.
This remedy is by no means confined to persons attempting to ship
goods illegally to the Soviet bloc. A series of cases dealt with American
and Mexican firms which engaged in exporting to Mexico a particular
type of used rail. The National Production Authority had determined
in the interest of national defense that such rails could be exported if
they were to be laid as track, but not in order to be rerolled. In applying
for export licenses respondents misrepresented that the rails were to
be relaid, whereas in fact they were rerolled. In all cases the Mexican
as well as the American firms were denied export privileges.56
51. Exportation of certain other categories of goods is regulated by other agencies
of the Government. The most important of these is the control of shipments of imple-
ments of war by the National Munitions Control Board, Department of State. 68
Stat. 848, 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (Supp. V, 1958). For other categories, see 15 C.F.R.
§ 370.4.
52. The procedure is identical with that for domestic violations. See text accom-
panying note 18 supra.
53. 15 C.F.R. § 382.1.
54. 15 C.F.R. § 381.5(b).
55. 15 C.F.R. § 381.6; see also id. § 381.4.
56. Laminadora Atzcapotzalco, S.A., 19 Fed. Reg. 6954 (1954); Commercial
Metals Co., 19 Fed. Reg. 4095 (1954); Arturo Flores, 19 Fed. Reg. 4112 (1954)
(all same transaction); Richard Nathan Corp., 21 Fed. Reg. 595 (1956); Cia.
Comercial Colon, S.A., 22 Fed. Reg. 725 (1957) (same transaction); California
Trading Co., 19 Fed. Reg. 6533 (1954).
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In another case an American exporter shipping goods under gen-
eral license to Cuba fraudulently entered low values on the documents
in order to help the Cuban importer escape certain import duties. The
compliance commissioner, in recommending a suspended denial for both
respondents, said, "[T]he objective sought by them, though not to be
condoned, had become a frequent practice among exporters to Cuba,
a practice which should be stopped and to which end public notice in the
form of this order is desirable." 67
Ignorance of American law is generally not a defense to the foreign
respondent." He will also be held accountable if he knows or should
know that those with whom he does business have previously been
denied privileges by the Bureau. 9 However, it must be shown that the
violator did have actual knowledge of illegality in dealing with cases of
misrepresentation, unlawful diversion of goods, or transacting business
with persons under suspension. 0
Foreign firms have been subject to action for legally exporting
goods of United States origin from their own country, yet violating
United States law. The problem arises when the United States export
license gives Israel, for instance, as ultimate destination yet Israel
permits export to Bulgaria and issues a license although the buyer
could not have exported the goods directly from the United States to
Bulgaria."
57. Ace Export Co., 19 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1954). This use of the export control
regulations to prevent violations of foreign law is questionable as a matter of policy.
Canadian firms found to have violated United States regulations are prohibited from
using Canadian export outlets for export of strategic goods. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1951, p. 17, col. 6.
58. Guy N. F. Nord, Ltd., 17 Fed. Reg. 1633 (1952); see also Stemmler-Imex,
N.V., 21 Fed. Reg. 1942 (1956), affirming 20 Fed. Reg. 8202 (1955). See Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Investigation~s on Ea.st-West Trade, Senate Committee
on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 350, 352 (1956).
59. 15 C.F.R. §381.10; Johannes M. A. Klaasen, 18 Fed. Reg. 7179 (1953).
The forwarding agent was "a notorious known transshiper of strategic Ameri-
can goods to Soviet areas" and had been deprived of American privileges.
"[Sluch deprivation was a matter of general knowledge in Holland; but . . . such
knowledge failed to deter Klaasen . . . from continuing to employ [his] services.
." This successively caught a French Company which later sold American goods
to KYlaasen, for which it was denied export privileges. Union Europ&nne de Produits
Chimiques, 20 Fed. Reg. 9469 (1955). See also Gyma Labs. of America, Inc., 21
Fed. Reg. 6305 (1956), where respondent was denied privileges for permitting a firm
under suspension to arrange a transaction with another firm without inquiring into
the relation between the two.
60. 15 C.F.R. § 381. See Francesco Parisi, 17 Fed. Reg. 483 (1952), revoking
Smoliner & Kratky, 16 Fed. Reg. 12794 (1951).
61. Sudexport and General Import Export Co., 22 Fed. Reg. 4512 (1957);
Richard Fleschner Import-Export, 22 Fed. Reg. 2717 (1957) ; Codechimie S.P.R.L.,
22 Fed. Reg. 2741 (1957). And see Nisan Simon Cohen, 22 Fed. Reg. 3134 (1957),
where respondent was denied export privileges for legally shipping aureomycin to
China from the Netherlands, when he knew such commodity could originate only in
the United States and that it could not be purchased in the United States if destined
for China. Respondent was not involved in the export transaction, having purchased
the aureomycin from a vendor in the Netherlands who in turn had purchased it from
the Belgian importer.
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The Bureau is generally more lenient with foreign firms which
cooperate with American investigators overseas. Recently a com-
pliance commissioner praised respondents in one case for not defending
by dilatory tactics or false denials, but nevertheless denied them all
export privileges for one year." That this was lenient may be seen
by comparing it with another order where it was noted the Japanese
respondents had willfully refused to cooperate and that Bureau agents
had been unable to discover what had happened to the goods. Even
though the charges were not proved, the compliance commissioner
permanently denied all export privileges, giving as his reason that
respondents had shown that any attempt to police exports to them
would be frustrated.' In another case the Dutch forwarder's general
manager put off inquiries by the United States consulate concerning
whereabouts of a dismantled mill then in Rotterdam harbor until after
the mill was en route to Hungary. The denial order permitted the
forwarder to apply for a modification if it dismissed its general
manager.6
4
Persons engaged in export transactions are required to report to
the Bureau any information they have by which they suspect an unlaw-
ful diversion may occur. How small a suspicion must be reported is
unclear. 5 This duty to make known such facts is imposed upon foreign
respondents also."6
Other factors have been given as reasons for not imposing strict
penalties on respondents. The financial impact on respondent 67 or on
third parties,"8 if other circumstances justify it, may reduce the harsh
effect of a long period of suspension. That the goods involved were
not of a strategic nature, or were not destined for the Soviet bloc, may
work in respondent's favor.0 9 The respondent's "good behavior"
62. Continental Import & Export Co., 20 Fed. Reg. 8224 (1955), appeal denied,
21 Fed. Reg. 2208 (1956) ; see also Union Europdenne de Produits Chimiques, 20 Fed.
Reg. 9469 (1955).
63. Levee & Co., 21 Fed. Reg. 775 (1956) ; see also Electrical Agencies (London),
Ltd., 18 Fed. Reg. 2659 (1953). Parties are required to disclose information as to
past uses of export licenses. If, without justification, they do not, they are not en-
titled to participate in future export transactions. London Export Corp., 21 Fed.
Reg. 1941 (1956); M. Newmark & Co., 21 Fed. Reg. 2851 (1956) (refusal to answer
written interrogatories).
64. Satis, A. G., 16 Fed. Reg. 10088 (1951). Privileges were restored three and
one-half years later, the dismissal requirement having been vacated. N. V. Neder-
lands Transport Bureau, 20 Fed. Reg. 4596 (1955).
65. See Willys-Overland Export Corp., 20 Fed. Reg. 4191 (1955).
66. Joachim Wilhelm Krugel, 18 Fed. Reg. 5521 (1953).
67. D. Lijnzaad, N.V., 20 Fed. Reg. 8226 (1955), appeal denied, 21 Fed. Reg.
2853 (1956).
68. See United Petrolifera Italiana S.R.L., 21 Fed. Reg. 5197 (1956).
69. Confidential Overseas Forwarding, Inc., 21 Fed. Reg. 3295, modified, 21 Fed.
Reg. 3703, 5240 (1956).
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during the investigation or thereafter may result in a lessening of the
penalties. This was given as the reason for rescinding a denial order
after four years in force.7" Other mitigating factors were the duration
of the temporary denial order,71 or other penalties already imposed on
respondent. 7' Also considered in mitigation have been the fact that
international relations were not as tense at the time of the diversion,"
and the "necessity of rebuilding Japan after hostilities." 7"
While there have been instances of the charges against foreign
respondents being dismissed,75 where the charges are found true other
defenses are generally passed over. The intermediary's fear that his
American seller would take over his future business with his Czech
customer was rejected as "frivolous." " The legality of the foreign
company's actions where it is situated and where the actions took place
is not a defense to contraventions of United States law.7 7  As to
misrepresentations it is not difficult to find that the misrepresentation
took place in the United States when received by the Bureau of Foreign
Commerce, and therefore there is jurisdiction as over any events occur-
ring within the national territory. A more serious matter is the claim
that United States law continues to govern after the goods have
reached their stated destination.78 While this claim would doubtless be
recognized in United States courts,7" it is doubtful if a similar result
would be reached in foreign courts.
In addition the Bureau asserts its authority to investigate in
foreign countries on the basis of the statute,80 yet the statutory
authority is not in the explicit language usually required by courts in
order to be interpreted as extending into foreign jurisdictions. In
fact the section could well be interpreted as referring only to the
confines of the United States, as it gives power to United States courts
to enforce subpoenas, which power is necessarily restricted to territorial
70. Paul Wormser & Co., 19 Fed. Reg. 5064 (1954), rescinding 15 Fed. Reg.
3194 (1950).
71. Richard Fleschner Import-Export, 22 Fed. Reg. 2717 (1957).
72. K. Burgi-Tobler & Co., 22 Fed. Reg. 1343 (1957) (seizure of goods);
Jerome E. Robinson, 22 Fed. Reg. 2217 (1957) (prison term and loss of job).
73. Joachim Wilhelm Krugel, 18 Fed. Reg. 5521 (1953).
74. Shotaro Higasa, 18 Fed. Reg. 6722 (1953).
75. I. K. Lai, 21 Fed. Reg. 777 (1956); Arbuckle, Smith & Co., 20 Fed. Reg.
7554 (1955).
76. S. A. Comptoir N. V. Paul Stevens & Co., 16 Fed. Reg. 9667 (1951).
77. Continental Import & Export Co., 20 Fed. Reg. 8224 (1955).
78. Sudexport & General Import Export Co., 22 Fed. Reg. 4512 (1957); see
text accompanying note 61 supra.
79. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416, 443-44 (2d
Cir. 1945).
80. 63 Stat. 8 (1949), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2026(a) (1952) ; London Export Corp.,
21 Fed. Reg. 1941 (1956), order issued, 21 Fed. Reg. 3765 (1956).
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jurisdiction. Such an interpretation would seriously hamper enforce-
ment of the law.
Denial of privileges may occur whether or not action has been
taken against respondent locally. The Bureau's order sometimes notes
such occurrences, and indicates that respondent has been arrested or his
goods seized by the local authorities. 1 In one case it was noted the
United States occupation authorities in Austria had detained the
goods.8
It is clear, however, that American authorities may not be so
fortuitously placed in the future as to be able to intercept goods destined
for illegal destinations. It is also clear that, had controls presently in
effect in certain foreign countries been in effect previously, violation of
American controls would have been more difficult. One Krugel, an
English broker, shipped Positive List goods from the United States to
Switzerland by giving false statements to export control authorities
in the United States, and then diverting the goods at Antwerp from
Switzerland to the Soviet Union.' Transaction controls now in effect
in England 84 would have made such a transaction illegal in England."
But at the time denial of American export privileges was the only
remedy.
One factor which must be remembered at all times is the overriding
discretion of the Bureau in granting licenses, subject only to the broad
policies set forth in the act." Even if insufficient evidence is disclosed
as to violations by a particular person to justify a denial order, the
Bureau will carefully scrutinize any license application for a transaction
involving such person. The same is true in regard to those persons
against whom denial orders have expired and those engaged in Iron
Curtain transactions not originating in the United States.
87
Administrative action by the United States against foreign persons
who have violated its export control regulations is effective only
prospectively. The possibility of being denied such privileges may be
a sufficient deterrent to many importers and others overseas who do a
large business in the United States. Such a denial also punishes the
particular violator by making him go elsewhere than the United States
81. See, e.g., Well Lu Trading Co., 19 Fed. Reg. 3009 (1954); Maurice May,
Inc., 17 Fed. Reg. 964 (1952).
82. Gambaro Corp. Constr. Co., 16 Fed. Reg. 3670 (1951).
83. Joachim Wilhelm Krugel, 18 Fed. Reg. 5521 (1953).
84. Strategic Goods (Control) Order, [1954] 2 STAT. INSTR. 2174 (No. 1622),
as amended, [1955] 2 STAT. INSTR. 2546 (No. 1280).
85. See MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL AcT, FIFTH REPORT 27 (1954)
(hereinafter cited as 5 MDAC).
86. 63 Stat. 7 (1949), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2022 (1952); 15 C.F.R. § 373.1.
87. See Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking & Currency on H.R.
4882, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1953). About 15% of requests for licenses are not
favorably acted upon. Hearings on H.R. 4882, .supra at 25.
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for his business. But such action does not bring back the goods, nor,
in a majority of the situations, does it stop them.
III. EFFORTS TO SECURE COOPERATION OF FOREIGN NATIONS
If the Export Control Act were made to depend for its enforcement
solely upon the administrative power of the Bureau of Foreign Com-
merce to deny export privileges, the export control policy of the United
States might be in large measure frustrated. In order to prevent goods
from reaching their illegal destinations after they have left the United
States it is necessary to elicit the cooperation of the nation into whose
jurisdiction the goods have passed. Toward this end Congress has
passed certain coercive legislation designed to induce sister nations
to support our embargo policies. Another focus of United States
policy to be discussed in this section, less publicized, but more effective
in obtaining unity of methods and aims, is the western informal com-
mittee on East-West trade known as the Consultative Group.
Under the Battle Act 8 the President is authorized to enlist the
aid of all nations in enforcing the policy of the United States as declared
by Congress. 9 Section 101 declares that policy to be the placing of
an embargo on the shipment of arms and other items of primary
strategic significance to any "nation . . . threatening the security of
the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
." Under the act two embargo lists were drawn up and went
into effect on January 24, 1952. The Title I, Category A list is com-
posed of "arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy
materials"; all military, economic, or financial assistance must be cut
off to any nation which knowingly permits shipment of any of the
items on this list to the Soviet bloc. The Title I, Category B list
contains other strategic materials named in section 103 (a) ; 90 assistance
must be cut off to any nation as before, but the President has discretion
not to cut off aid if it "would clearly be detrimental to the security of
the United States." 91 The President has used his discretion not to
discontinue aid on several occasions.92
88. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 644, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 1611-13c (1952).
89. 65 Stat. 646, 647 (1951), 22 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a), 1613 (1952).
90. 1 MDAC 37, 43 (1952).
91. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 646, 22 U.S.C.
§1611b (1952). One interesting application of Battle Act sanctions occurred
with Ceylon. That country agreed to trade China rubber for rice. Although done
at considerable advantage to Ceylon, United States aid to Ceylon was halted. Hear-
ings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs o East-West Trade, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Hearings o; East-West Trade).
On Ceylon's admittance to the United Nations, aid was resumed. London Times,
Feb. 13, 1956, p. 6, col. 3; see N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1955, p. 13, col. 2.
92. 1 MDAC 45 (1952); 2 MDAC 77 (1953); 5 MDAC 65 (1954).
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A Joint Operating Committee (JOC) has been organized to co-
ordinate policies under the Export Control Act and Battle Act." The
International Cooperation Administration administers the Battle Act
lists of items which the United States believes should be controlled by
other countries. This is generally less inclusive than the Positive List
of goods drawn up by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, controlling
exports from the United States.
At the top of the structure of the Western World's controls on
trade with the Soviet bloc is the Consultative Group (CG). Fifteen
nations are represented there on the ministerial level." The Consultative
Group meets at intervals to discuss the economic defense policy of the
members in order better to coordinate their strategic trade controls.9
CG has two day-to-day working groups, the Coordinating Committee
(COCOM), which is concerned with trade with Eastern Europe, and
the China Committee (CHINCOM), concerned with the more drastic
restrictions on trade with Communist China."
CG is responsible for drawing up the international lists 91 of which
there are four: 1) items totally embargoed, 2) items for which a quota
has been found appropriate, 3) items to be carefully watched, and 4)
the China list containing additional items completely embargoed in
regard to China and North Korea in accordance with the United
Nations resolution of May 18, 1951.198 These lists constitute a minimum
level which all countries accept. The national control lists of many
members, including the United States' Positive List, contain many more
items than the agreed minimum.99
In previous years disagreement has been evidenced over relaxation
of controls on nonstrategic goods."° Revisions have occurred periodi-
93. JOC is composed of representatives of the agencies sitting on the Advisory
Committee on Export Policy (ACEP), which advises the Secretary of Commerce,
and the Economic Defense Advisory Committee (EDAC), which advises the Secre-
tary of State and Director of ICA on free world strategic controls. Hearings on
East-West Trade 5.
94. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, West Germany.
95. Hearings o East-West Trade 7.
96. 5 MDAC at vii (1955).
97. Hearings on East-West Trade 24. For a description of the interrelation of
the international and Battle Act lists, see 33 DEP'T STATE BULL. 921 (1955).
98. This list has been abolished by most of the members other than the United
States. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1957, p. 3, col. 4.
99. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Investigations on East-West Trade,
Senate Committee on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 350 (1956).
100. Controls on trade with Communist China have been a source of disagree-
ment. Many members of the United Nations, not members of the Consultative Group,
voluntarily joined in this embargo. Hearings on East-West Trade 2. But in 1957
the British government finally gave in to considerable pressure at home and in the
Commonwealth and unilaterally relaxed these controls. Export of Goods (Control)
(Consolidation) Order, 1956 (amend. 4), STAT. INsTR., 1957, No. 950; see N.Y. Times,
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cally; the purpose is not mere reduction, but a more meaningful and
selective coverage.10 1
One result of international cooperation has been the import cer-
tificate-delivery verification (IC/DV) procedure.0 2  By this device
the exporting nation, by virtue of its jurisdiction over the exporter,
requires him to demand from the importer with whom he deals a
commitment by the importer to the importer's country that the goods
once imported will be used in that country. Thus, the exportation can-
not take place until the importer has subjected himself to the effective
criminal sanctions of his own country. In this way the exporting nation
has the duty of discovering whether its embargo legislation has been
violated, but it also has the necessary information to determine whether
a violation has taken place.
While most COCOM nations have adopted IC/DV procedure with
the United States, its use is not as widespread as American officials
would like.'03 It cannot prevent transshipment; it merely makes dis-
covery of transshipment easier and puts a greater burden on the im-
porter by making him subject to penalties by his own government for
unauthorized diversion or transshipment. The difficulty is that only
those countries cooperating with the United States as a matter of
policy have agreed to this system; exporters shipping goods to other
countries must do with the less reliable consignee/purchaser statement
from the importer. Nor is the procedure applicable to overseas terri-
May 31, 1957, p. 1, col. 8. As to possible Battle Act sanctions, see S. REP. No. 2621,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1956). The new controls are identical with those on
exports to other countries in the Soviet bloc. A suggested revision by the United
States within COCOM was rejected. The gap in policies has been widened with
similar decontrol action by France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and Japan.
N.Y. Times, May 6, 1957, p. 1, col. 7; June 19, 1957, p. 3, col. 6; July 17, 1957, p. 3,
col. 4. Decontrol was accomplished despite the rigid opposition of the United States,
which still maintains the "total economic embargo" against Communist China and
North Korea in effect since December 1950. Hearings mo East-West Trade 2. A
loophole in this policy exists where American corporations share in profits of sale to
Communist China by their Japanese affiliates and licensees. Wall St. J., Aug. 30,
1957, p. 1, col. 1.
101. SEC=RARY OF COmmERCE, 34rH REPORT ON EXPORT CONTROL 15 (1956).
The last revision occurred on August 15, 1958. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1958, p. 7, col. 1;
Aug. 15, 1958, p. 2, col. 6; Sept 4, 1958, p. 44, col. 1.
102. See 15 C.F.R. § 373.2, Explanatory Statement 1 (1956). The Bureau requires
submission of an import certificate by the exporter, showing the importer's commit-
ment to his government that the goods will be used in that country; upon delivery,
a delivery verification certificate must be submitted. Both documents are issued by
the government of the importer. For IC/DV procedure in regard to imports to the
United States from COCOM countries, see 15 C.F.R. § 368 (1956). If the shipment
is to be made to a nation which does not issue import certificates, a consignee/pur-
chaser statement from the purchaser and ultimate consignee is required. Id. § 373.65,
as amended, 22 Fed. Reg. 784 (1957).
103. Hearings wt East-West Trade 27. Among the nations issuing import cer-
tificates are all COCOM members, Switzerland, Belgian Congo and Hong Kong.
104. See 15 C.F.R. § 373.2, Explanatory Statement 10 (1956).
1959]
346 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107
tories of COCOM members."0 4  Despite its limitations it is gener-
ally agreed that use of this procedure would make impossible today
some of the cases of flagrant violation of controls in the past.105
Export Control in Great Britain
The United States Government may request the foreign government
in question to prevent a diversion of the goods." 6 As an example, we
shall examine briefly British export controls.
At the present time control over exportation of goods is strictly
regulated in Great Britain. Authority for the present scheme was
enacted in 1939,17 although some controls existed during the first world
war. The legislation of 1939 permits the Board of Trade to prohibit or
regulate exportation of goods from the United Kingdom as "the Board
think expedient." '" Goods exported in violation of law or "brought
to any quay or other place, or waterborne, for the purpose of being
exported" in violation of law are deemed to be prohibited goods and
shall be forfeit, and the exporter is liable to a penalty of £500."09 An
exporter must, if requested, satisfy the Commissioners of Custom that
the goods have reached their destination; the Commissioners have
power to detain shipments when they suspect a false statement as to
their ultimate destination.110
The list of goods for which licenses are required is published
under authority of the act, and brought up to date periodically. It con-
tains regulations in regard to applying for licenses, as well as schedules
of restricted commodities."' The First Schedule contains a list of all
commodities for which an export license is required. Certain items
(marked therein with the letter "A") require no license for export to
the British Commonwealth, United States, and Ireland."' All other
items require no license; it is the responsibility of the exporter to show
that the item does not appear on the First Schedule.
105. See, e.g., Joachim Wilhelm Krugel, 18 Fed. Reg. 5521 (1953); Board of
Trade v. Owen. [1957] 1 All E.R. 411 (H.L.).
106. See United Petrolifera Italiana S.R.L., 21 Fed. Reg. 5197 (1956).
107. Import, Export & Customs Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 69.
108. 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 69, § 1(1).
109. 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 69, § 3(1). The comparable American regulation may be
found at 15 C.F.R. § 381.1(b), making subject to forfeiture any goods "attempted to
be, or being, or intended to be, or which have been" exported in violation of law.
110. 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 69, § 7. See 15 C.F.R. § 381, and text accompanying
note 54 szipra.
111. Exports of Goods (Control) (Consolidation) Order, [1956] 1 STAT. INsTR.
578 (No. 1702), as anmended, id. at 611 (No. 1960), [1957] 1 STAT. INSTR. 594 (No.
247), 600 (No. 950), 601 (No. 1281), 604 (No. 2169). The former Second Schedule,
listing additional items for which a license was required for export to China, Macao,
North Vietnam, Tibet, and North Korea, was revoked by STAT. INSTR., 1957, No. 950.
112. Export of Goods (Control) (Consolidation) Order §5(a), [1956] 1 STAT.
INSTR 578 (No. 1702).
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A major difference between the American and British licensing
systems is that the latter has no provisions concerning denial of ex-
porting privileges. There is no published blacklist of names; control
is maintained entirely in the discretionary granting or refusing to grant
applications for licenses by the Board of Trade. As in the United States,
all information given by exporters is confidential . 1 3 One result of this
is that United States authorities are able to penalize violators of the law
in respect to exporting of any goods, whereas it appears the British
authorities exercise their control only over strategic goods. Neverthe-
less, any licenses or other authority given may be modified or revoked
at any time." 4
Transaction controls were recently put into effect in Great Britain
prohibiting the disposal of goods situated outside the United Kingdom
by persons within the United Kingdom to any person in the Soviet
bloc." 5
A number of prosecutions have taken place in England, but this
method of deterring violations received a serious setback recently in the
decision of the House of Lords in Board of Trade v. Owen." The
Lords held no indictment could be drawn for a conspiracy to violate
foreign law if no unlawful acts took place in England. The defendants
had acquired lead, copper and steel in West Germany by means of Irish
end-use statements, the actual destination of the goods being Eastern
Europe. There was no connection with England here except that the
defendants were subject to British jurisdiction.
Suits by the Sovereign in Foreign Courts To Restrain Re-Export
If the British government were not disposed to enact export con-
trols, the possibility that the United States Government could obtain
an injunction in a British court to enforce its own controls must be
discounted. The decision of King of Italy v. de Medici Tornaquinci "
7
exemplifies the situation here. Members of the Medici family had re-
moved ancient family documents from Italy with the intention of selling
113. Export Control Act of 1949, §6(c), 63 Stat. 7, 50 U.S.C. Apr. §2026(c)
(1952) ; 535 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 32 (1954).
114. Export of Goods (Control) (Consolidation) Order, 1956, § 10, [1956] 1
STAT. INSTR. 582.
115. Strategic Goods (Control) Order, 1954, [1954] 2 STAT. INSTR. 2174 (No.
1622), as amended, [1955] 2 STAT. INSTR. 2546 (No. 1280), [1956] 2 STAT. INSTR.
2329 (No. 577), STAT. INSTR., 1957, Nos. 245, 1282, 2170. Such controls are not new
in England, but were in effect in regard to some commodities during World War I.
See It; re Anglo-Russian Merchant Traders, Ltd., [1917] 2 K.B. 679 (C.A.).
116. [1957] All E.R. 411 (H.L.) ; see 71 HAaV. L. REv. 371 (1957).
117. 34 T.L.R. 623 (Ch. 1918).
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them in London. The court assumed the removal from Italy to be a
violation of Italian law making such exportations illegal. He then
distinguished between State papers and other documents having merely
historical interest, granting an injunction against sale of the former
only on the ground that it was not clear whether they were the property
of the family or the State. An injunction was not granted as to the
latter group, the court refusing to order these papers returned to Italy
as they clearly belonged to the family.
In the hypothetical situation here, a court would not need to order
the goods returned to the United States, since to leave them where they
were would be to carry out the terms of the license granted. However,
as the United States' interest is not one of property, but only of policy,
the court would have no jurisdiction.'"
IV. DEFENSES TO CIVIL SUITS IN FOREIGN COURTS
Violation of American export controls may subject the offender
to denial of trading privileges, criminal prosecution, and confiscation
of goods, either under American law or the parallel controls of sister
nations. However, the exporter or carrier who acts in compliance with
United States law may by so doing breach the contract of export and
thus become liable to civil suit in a court of a foreign nation not having
parallel controls. To what extent would the mandate of United States
law provide a defense?
Illegal Contract
In the ordinary situation where an American exporter has arranged
to sell an importer goods, he must comply with United States law in
order to effect exportation. A contract originally made with the
intention of frustrating American controls might be carried out as
follows. The exporter wishes to ship goods to country X, but the
Bureau of Foreign Commerce will not grant a license for export of such
goods to that country. A license will be granted for export to the United
Kingdom, however, and such goods may be exported from there to
country X without a license.
It is clear by British law that a contract made in violation of
foreign law, the performance of which will necessarily mean doing an
illegal act in the national territory of that State, will not be enforced
in an English court. This result was affirmed recently in Regazzoni v.
K. C. Sethia, Ltd."' In 1946, the Indian government prohibited the
118. See DicEY, CONFUCT OF LAws 152 (6th ed. 1949).
119. [1956] 2 Q.B. 490 (C.A. 1955).
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direct or indirect shipment of goods to South Africa as a political
protest against treatment of Indians in that country. The parties
engaged to ship jute bags from India to Europe where the plaintiff
was to make the sale to a South African buyer. The defendants changed
their minds and refused to deliver the goods. The court refused to
enforce the contract, putting great emphasis on the fact that both parties
knew and intended a violation of the Indian embargo and that perform-
ance of the contract could not be carried out without such a violation.
The court's decision is based on two rules, one that foreign law will
be applied unless contrary to some English public policy, and the other
that foreign legislation should be construed restrictively, and "as oper-
ating only within the territory of the sovereign." ,0 That the law is
intended to operate extraterritorially is of no consequence, 121 unless a
statute of the law of the forum expressly recognizes such an effect.
12
The court rejected contentions that the Indian law was either a penal or
revenue law, confiscatory, or political. Even if the Indian legislation
were construed as operating only within Indian territory, it was here
the intention of the parties to violate the Indian law within India by
attempting to take the jute out of Indian territory unlawfully.
In following Foster v. Driscoll," a case involving a scheme to
take whisky from England into the United States in violation of United
States law, the court said,
"There the venture was to get a prohibited commodity into
the United States by finding someone . . . to take or smuggle
it into the country and so earn high profits. Here the venture was
dependent on someone getting out of the country the prohibited
commodity which would fulfill this contract and enable the plain-
tiff in his turn to steal a march on lawful traders and make his
profit out of the urgent demand of South Africa for jute bags." 14
If there is any way the contract could be carried out without a
violation of law, it will be presumed the parties intended to do it that
way." 5 If the parties have not contracted for goods of American
120. DicEy, CoN~i'cr OF LAws 155 (6th ed. 1949).
121. See Frankfurther v. W. L. Exner, Ltd., [1947] Ch. 629.
122. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 218-21 (1942) (executive agreement);
Perutz v. Bohemian Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953) (membership in Inter-
national Monetary Fund) ; accord, Re Amand, [1941] 2 K.B. 239, 254-55, [1942] 1
K.B. 445, appeal denied, [1942] 2 K.B. 26 (C.A.), aff'd, [1943] A.C. 147; see DiC.Y,
CoNFLicT OF LAws 1953 (6th ed. 1949). But see 7 HALSBuRY, LAws OF ENGLAND
283 (3d ed. 1954).
123. [1929] 1 K.B. 470 (C.A.).
124. [1956] 2 Q.B. at 503.
125. [1929] 1 K.B. at 496 (Scrutton, L.J., dissenting). See Holman v. Johnson,
1 Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775); cf. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v.
Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1955] Ch. 37 (1954).
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origin, but merely for such goods of any origin, the seller can perform
without violating American export controls, and illegality will not
prevent enforcement of the contract." 6 The result would not differ even
though the applicable law of the contract were different from the law
making it illegal. In both Foster v. Driscoll and Regazzoni v. K.C.
Sethia the proper law of the contract was English law, yet the respective
contracts were found to be violative of American and Indian statutes
and were not enforced. If the parties to the transaction have stipulated
American law, an English court would be able to hold the contract
unenforceable with greater ease as unenforceable by its proper law.
127
Liability of Carriers for Refusal To Land Goods
Serious conflict may arise in a situation in which the American
Government orders an American flag vessel not to deliver goods to the
consignee.2 8 In 1950, a South African shipped jute bags from India to
Venezuela, via New York. As they were transshipped in the United
States, an intransit license was required, jute bags being on the Positive
List. After leaving New York, they were diverted to South Africa, but
the United States Government ordered the ship, nationality not dis-
closed, not to deliver to the consignee. The shipper then brought suit in
South Africa for delivery and was opposed by the carrier and representa-
tives of the United States Government, but he later withdrew the suit
and was permitted to land the bags. 9 Although the fact is not
disclosed, if the ship were a United States flag vessel, the restraint of
princes clause 130 in the bill of lading would probably absolve the vessel
from liability. The consignee and shipper were one and the same, so
no loss could occur, assuming the shipper would have the goods or
equivalent value returned to him.
In American President Lines, Ltd. v. China Mut. Trading Co.lal
an American carrier was held liable for damages for nondelivery of
126. See Cooper & Sons v. Neilson & Maxwell, Ltd., [1919] Vict. L.R. 66;
P. N. Gray & Co. v. Cavalliotis, 276 Fed. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd mee., 293 Fed.
1018 (2d Cir. 1923).
127. Heriz v. Riera, 11 Sim. 318, 59 Eng. Rep. 896 (Ch. 1840); cf. De Wutz v.
Hendricks, 2 Bing. 314, 130 Eng. Rep. 326 (C.P. 1824) (transaction "contrary to
the law of nations"). See also 7 HALsnuRy, LAws oF ENGLAND 386 (3d ed. 1954).
128. 15 C.F.R. § 379.11.
129. Ihsan M. Beydoun, 16 Fed. Reg. 3671 (1951). It is difficult to ascertain
what occurred from the brief commentary in the denial order. It is likely the parties
came to an agreement whereby Beydoun dropped his suit, and the regulations were
amended so that jute bags moving in transit through the United States could be
exported without a license. Beydoun received his jute but was permanently denied
all export privileges. The Government may have settled out of court in order to
avoid losing in court.
130. Carrier will not be liable for loss arising from arrest or restraint of princes.
49 Stat 1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(g) (1952).
131. 1953 Am. Mar. Cas. 1510 (Hong Kong Sup. Ct.).
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goods to a Chinese buyer following imposition of the American em-
bargo. After the ship had sailed from San Francisco, but before it
arrived at Hong Kong, the United States Government issued orders
prohibiting American vessels from discharging at a foreign port goods
destined for buyers in Communist countries.182  The goods were un-
loaded before the ship was aware of the order, but the godown (ware-
house) withheld delivery on orders of the carrier.las The Supreme
Court of Hong Kong, affirming the decision of the trial court, said the
bill of lading, which provided for United States law, covered only the
contract of carriage, which ended with discharge of the goods. After
that, the bill of lading survived only as a document of title. Both the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act'" and regulation T-1 use the word
"discharge," which the court, following the principle that foreign law
should be interpreted as restrictively as possible, said referred to un-
loading and not to delivery. Therefore, United States law could be
applied only to the question of the right to forbid unloading and not to
delivery. 2
The court's decision hinged on its interpretation of "discharge,"
a restrictive interpretation, but one which agrees with the precise
wording of the regulation. 6 Both American and British courts have
held discharge refers to the moment the goods leave the ship's tackle,
and therefore not to delivery.1 7 Having found the coverage of the bill
of lading ended with unloading the goods, the court was then able to
say that as it applied no longer, the restraint of princes applied no
longer. The carrier's refusal to deliver was an attempt to retrieve its
previous error. The parties had not provided for this occurrence, and
therefore the carrier was not protected. The buyer was given a judg-
ment for the contract price plus agreed damages.
A nation can maintain control over its national vessels at all times.
An order by a government to a vessel flying its flag will not be ques-
132. 32A C.F.R. 209, reg. T-1 (1958).
133. The godown was joined as a defendant, but the court expressed no opinion
as to whether it was the agent of the carrier.
134. 49 Stat. 1208 (1936), 45 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1952).
135. This may be explained on the ground that the court thought the parties
"intended" Hong Kong law to govern this aspect, the contract not expressing their
intention on its face.
136. "No person shall discharge from any such [U.S. flag] ship . . . any such
commodity [on Positive List] . . . at any such port [Hong Kong or Macao]
unless a validated export license . . . has been obtained for the shipment. . "
32A C.F.R. 209, reg. T-1, § 1 (1958).
137. Remington Rand, Inc. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 129,
137 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Federal Ins. Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
540 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (act does not apply when cargo is on a lighter). Discharge is
completed when the goods are on the lighter when all goods to be unloaded have in
fact been unloaded. Lindsay Blee Depots, Ltd. v. Motor Union Ins. Co., 37 Lloyd's
List L.R. 220 (K.B. 1930).
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tioned by a court." s It is submitted that an order by the United States
Government to one of its flag vessels not to deliver the cargo to the
consignee should protect the ship from liability."8 9 How far such an
order should be permitted to extend, however, is a different matter.
After the goods have been unloaded, performance is involved. If the
consignee has the bill of lading, it would seem he is entitled to im-
mediate delivery of the goods, even though it would be illegal by the
law of the ship's flag. If the goods have been exported from the United
States, the consignee's bill of lading will presumably stipulate United
States law. A British court would probably give effect to such a
provision so that even though the goods are in England, and the con-
signee is the acknowledged owner, the law of the contract as agreed by
the parties forbids delivery to him."4 On the other hand, if the goods
have been exported from somewhere other than the United States, such
transaction being a violation of the Transaction Controls,14' and the
parties have not stipulated American law, the court will have to decide
what law the parties intended to govern. No matter what the answer
to this question may be, a British court would probably construe the
restraint as a restraint of princes, relieving the ship of liability under
that clause in the bill of lading unless to do so would be contrary to
public policy under the law of the forum."
The trial court in the American President Lines case " found that
the American orders were political in the sense that they were directed
against designated countries, but not in the sense that that ground
alone would be a reason for not enforcing them here. Although he did
not hold on this ground, the trial judge said,
"I have reached the opinion that these orders and regulations
are indeed confiscatory against those subject to the jurisdiction of
the Courts in Hong Kong whose property may be refused to them,
138. Earn Line S.S. Co. v. Sutherland S.S. Co., 254 Fed. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1918),
aff'd sub noin. The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276 (2d Cir. 1920). But see A/S Tallinna
Laevau-hisus v. Tallinn Co., 175 L.T.R. (n.s.) 285 (K.B. 1946). See also Aubert
v. Gray, 3 B.&S. 163, 122 Eng. Rep. 62 (Ex. 1862) (requisition of vessel by its
government); Miller v. Law Acc. Ins. Co., [1903] 1 K.B. 712 (C.A.) (order by
local government at port of disembarkation preventing unloading).
139. See Furness, Withy, & Co. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Banco, [1917] K.B. 873.
140. Accord, Kahler v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1950] A.C. 24 (1949). But see
Loeb v. Bank of Manhattan Co., 18 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
141. 31 C.F.R. § 505 (Supp. 1958) ; see text accompanying note 47 supra.
142. Cf. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1955]
Ch. 37 (1954), where Danckwerts, J. upheld a British contract between British parties
condemned by an American court on the ground there was no evidence that the object
of the contract was to do anything illegal by American law, or that the plaintiff was
a party to the conspiracy.
143. China Mut. Trading Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 1953 Am.
Mar. Cas. 709, aff'd, id. at 1510 (Hong Kong Sup. Ct.).
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as in the present case for instance, with no provision at all,-in
so far as the documents before me go-either for restitution or
compensation."'"
Where foreign legislation purports to expropriate property situated
outside the country without compensation, it will not be given effect
in British courts, no matter what is the reason for the taking." The
compensation must be both adequate and prompt in order to save a
decree from being confiscatory.1 46  Foreign confiscatory legislation will
be recognized in England if the property is situated within the ter-
ritorial limits of the confiscating state at the time of the decree. The
nationality of the owner is generally not relevant.
147
These cases are to be distinguished from those involving a govern-
mental order affecting but not vesting title to the property of private
citizens, such as foreign exchange laws. Such orders are not strictly
confiscatory as the owner remains beneficial owner of the property in
question; the problem is whether he can obtain control or possession
of it.148  They are usually recognized by courts, even though partially
confiscatory, as within the legitimate power of government to act in
the general welfare. 14  But even if such orders are not confiscatory,
and are in accord with English public policy, there is good authority
that they will not be given extraterritorial effect. 50
It is not really appropriate to characterize a government order to
the carrier to deliver the goods when the consignee presents the bill of
lading as confiscatory action. Even though the consignee has already
paid for the goods, he has a right to have his money refunded, and
144. Id. at 713. The court sitting en banc on appeal expressed no opinion on this
ground. Id. at 1517.
145. Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart v. Slatford, [1953] 1 Q.B. 248, rev'd in
part on other grounds, id. at 279 (C.A.). See also State of Netherlands v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953), construing same Dutch decree. But see
Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502
(1942), where Lehman, C.J. held the same decree was not confiscatory, but that the
State became trustee for the true owners and therefore it did not offend the public
policy of New York.
146. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246, 253 (Aden
Sup. Ct) ; see 7 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 9 (3d ed. 1954).
147. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918) ; Re Helbert Wagg
& Co., [1956] 1 All E.R. 129, 139 (Ch. 1955) (see discussion of cases therein).
148. See Naamloze Vennootschap Suikerfabriek "Wono-Aseh" v. Chase Natl
Bank, 111 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Dix v. Bank of California Nat'l Ass'n,
113 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd mer. sub nor. Dix v. Pineda, 205 F.2d
957 (9th Cir. 1953); cf. Perutz v. Bohemian Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6
(1953).
149. There is no recognized principle that confiscation without adequate com-
pensation is per se a ground for refusing recognition to foreign legislation. Re
Helbert Wagg & Co., [1956] 1 All E.R. 129, 140-41 (Ch. 1955).
150. 7 HALsBuRy, LAws OF ENGLAND 283 (3d ed. 1954).
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hence cannot claim confiscation although in certain instances this right
may be subject to American foreign exchange controls. 151
Where the goods are aboard a non-American ship, the problem is
less easy of solution. Forfeiture proceedings may be brought against
such a carrier if it knowingly carries goods out of the United States in
violation of law. A ship which returns to the United States on another
voyage could be seized if it had previously violated the law.152 The
availability of this sanction may make foreign shipowners more co-
operative if their ships move regularly through United States ports. If
the Bureau of Foreign Commerce issues a stop order to such a carrier
there is greater likelihood of it being obeyed.' 53
If the carrier proceeds to its port of destination, a suit by the
consignee would be more likely to succeed in the case of a foreign
carrier than in a case where the vessel flies the United States flag.
Neither the ship nor its owners presumably would be subject to
American jurisdiction. A British court might conclude that the parties
did not intend American law to cover anything but carriage, and that
performance or delivery was to be governed by the law of the place ot
performance.' 54
Under British law performance is governed by the proper law of
the contract, and not by the lex loci solutionis, which extends only to
the mode or method of performance when interpreted not to change the
substantive or essential conditions of the contract. 5 Thus, if American
law were the proper law of the contract, whether or not delivery was to
be made should be governed by that law.
If the government does not act, the right of the shipper to prevent
delivery is extremely limited and appears to have no application here.
The shipper would not have the right of stoppage in transitu, as this is
a security arrangement for his protection only against the buyer's
insolvency, and is not designed to protect him against other types of
breach of contract. 56
151. 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (Supp. 1958). But see Nam Sun Trading Co. v. An-
dersen, Meyer Co., 35 Hong Kong L.R. 113 (1951).
152. 15 C.F.R. § 381.1(b).
153. 15 C.F.R. § 379.11. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1955, p. 30, col. 8, for a case
where a Japanese carrier returned goods to the United States aboard a different
vessel. See also K. Burgi-Tobler & Co., 22 Fed. Reg. 1343, 1344 (1957).
154. Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. t. Hard. 85, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734);
Pellecat v. Angell, 2 C.M. & R. 311, 150 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ex. 1835) ; Sharp v. Taylor,
2 Ph. 801, 41 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch. 1849).
155. Bonython v. Australia, [1951] A.C. 201, 220; cf. Mayor of Auckland v.
Alliance Assur. Co., [1937] A.C. 587, 606 (P.C.). See Note, 18 MODERN L. REv.
405 (1955).
156. See ScRurroN, CHAgRma'AaTis 208 (16th ed. 1955); SCHmITTHOFF, THE
ExpoRT TRADE 52, 55-58 (2d ed. 1950).
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If the exporter discovers that the consignee is going to divert the
goods contrary to United States law and to the ultimate destination
statement in the bill of lading, he may treat the contract as broken,
assuming the statement is a substantial term of the contract. How much
such a breach would be worth to the exporter in an action for damages
against the consignee is highly speculative, but the figure would
probably not be more than nominal. By treating the contract as broken,
however, the exporter could order the carrier not to deliver. But if the
consignee has already made a bona fide negotiation of the bill of lading
to a third party, the exporter loses all right of control over the goods. 1' 7
If the carrier does refuse to deliver to the consignee named in the
bill of lading, his position is similar to that supra, except that this is
not an act of State but simply a command by one party. It is doubtful it
the carrier would be protected in a suit by the buyer for nondelivery it
there is no specific clause in the contract. The carrier could raise the
claim that diversion of goods would make delivery illegal by American
law, but if there is no term relieving him of liability, the question would
be whether the court would construe the contract as providing by
implication for such a defense. If it does, a British court would doubt-
less hold the parties, including the buyer, bound by it. But if the parties
intended performance to be governed by the law of the place of perform-
ance, the fact that United States law required this clause against
diversion would not be relevant. 5 '
Liability of Consignee for Refusal To Re-Export From
"Ultimate Destination"
If it appeared that goods landed in a foreign country were going
to be re-exported contrary to the statements made to the Bureau of
Foreign Commerce, and the consignee in the foreign country were
neither the American exporter nor another American, the United
States Government could order him not to deliver the goods for re-
export. The particular export license might be revoked so that further
handling of the goods would be illegal by American law; the consignee's
export privileges could be suspended, which would automatically cancel
any licenses on which his name appeared. The question arises, however,
whether, assuming the law of the foreign country did not bar export of
these goods, possible action by the United States Government against
an American consignee would be a valid defense to a suit for non-
delivery by his purchaser.
157. Lickbarrow v. Mason, 5 T.R. 683, 101 Eng. Rep. 380 (IKB. 1794).
158. Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.).
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The leading English case is Kleinwort, Sons & Co. v. Ungarische
Baurnwolle Industrie Aktiengesellschaft.'59 The plaintiff accepted
three bills of exchange drawn by the defendant bank payable in three
months in London, the contract being arranged by letters. Some time
later the defendant notified the plaintiff that it would be able to
cover the bills only if Hungarian foreign exchange restrictions per-
mitted. The court found the defendant liable, holding first that the
foreign exchange restrictions were not part of the contract, and second
they would not constitute a valid defense anyway. The contract was
to be performed in England and the proper law was English law;
nothing was required to be done in Hungary. If the money were to
have been paid in Hungary, Hungarian law would have governed the
mode of performance, but in this case performance was not unlawful
at the place of performance."6  The court distinguished two prior
cases 161 on the ground that in both performance was unlawful by the
law of the country where performance was to take place.'2
In an earlier case the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
ordered a British carrier to pay a rebate specified in a contract of
carriage between Trinidad and New York, although such payment of
rebates had been declared illegal by Act of Congress. Lord Parmoor
could find no reason why the contract should not be enforced although
contrary to the lex loci contractus. It was valid by its proper law,
English law, and made between two Britons.""
If the proper law of the contract is found to be the law by which
the contract is claimed to be illegal or unenforceable, a different result
may ensue. The House of Lords distinguished the Kleinwort case in
Zivnostenska Banka Nat'l Corp. v. Frankman 104 in holding a Czecho-
slovakian bank not liable to deliver securities in London, even though
both parties and the securities were in England. The bank had
stipulated that the place of performance was to be the place of the bank's
branch which had carried out the transaction of purchase. This re-
159. [1939] 2 K.B. 678 (C.A.).
160. Cf. In re Sik's Estate, 205 Misc. 715, 129 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Surr. Ct.
1954).
161. De Beeche v. South Am. Stores, Ltd., [1935] A.C. 148; Ralli Bros. v.
Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar, [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (C.A.).
162. For an American case holding that the law of place of performance controls
matters relative to illegality and impossibility, see Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
per curiam, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 585 (1936).
163. Trinidad Shipping & Trading Co. v. G. R. Alston & Co., [1920] A.C.
888 (P.C.); see British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd.,
[1955] Ch. 37 (1954).
164. [1950] A.C. 57 (1949).
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ferred here to the head office in Prague; therefore Czech law was the
proper law of the contract and of its performance. In order to perform,
the Czech bank would have to violate Czech law in Czechoslovakia.
In Kahler v. Midland Bank, Ltd.," 5 decided the same day, the
Lords split on a similar situation. The plaintiff's Czech predecessor
had purchased securities in London held at a London bank in the name
of the Czech bank. The majority held the parties intended Czech law
to be the proper law of the contract, and by that law the plaintiff
(bailor) was not entitled to immediate possession, although his abso-
lute beneficial ownership was admitted. Lord Normand noted that but
for the proper law as found by the court, giving plaintiff possession
would not involve an act in a foreign country unlawful by its law; there
would be an in rem judgment if the plaintiff could have shown his
right to immediate possession.'"
The American party would not be able to withhold delivery of the
goods on order of the American Government and successfully defend a
breach of contract suit on the ground of impossibility of performance.
The American law does not affect the performance of the contract be-
cause American law is not the proper law, nor is it the law of the place
of performance. On the other hand, if the court found American law
were the governing law intended by the parties, the American seller
would be in a better position. In the latter situation, however, it might
well be contended that performance was to take place in England, and
therefore English law was intended to govern the performance.' 7
The answer to this would be to insert a specific clause stipulating
American law as was done in the Frankman case.
Basically, however, the question involved is how far do American
export controls extend, or in other words, when are the goods free from
American control? There must come a time when American law ceases
to have any effect.' The most logical time appears to be when the
165. [1950] A.C. 24 (1949).
166. Two judges dissented on the ground that English law should govern as
the law of the place of performance. For a similar result, see Naamloze
Vennootschap Suikerfabriek "Wono-Aselh" v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 111 F. Supp. 833
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also Nam Sun Trading Co. v. Anderson, Meyer Co., 35
Hong Kong L.R. 113 (1951), where, following frustration of a contract by the
American embargo on shipments to China, the Hong Kong court rejected the
American seller's argument that it was an implied term of the contract that refunds
be made where the deposits were paid, i.e., New York, and therefore frozen by
Treasury Department regulations. The court said it was only "natural" that
refunds be made where the buyer carried on its business.
167. Kahler v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1950] A.C. 24, 43 (1949) (Lord MacDermott
dissenting).
168. The Bureau of Foreign Commerce claims export controls follow the
goods to their ultimate destination. Sudexport and General Import Export Co.,
22 Fed. Reg. 4512 (1957).
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transaction in which the export of the goods occurred ends. After this
point, the owner and possessor of the goods is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, and neither are the goods. Any
contract he makes for the sale of the goods with anyone not in the
United States will have no connection with the United States, so that
United States law could not apply in any way.
Where the shipment is covered by a validated license, the ultimate
consignee must be named, together with the ultimate destination and
end-use. There, the transaction of carriage from the United States may
be only the first link in the chain. The named consignee in the bill
of lading may be only an intermediary, the one who is to reship the
goods to the ultimate consignee who is known to the Bureau, but not
to the exporter. Does American law extend over the second link of this
transaction, which is actually the subject matter of a contract different
from that between the exporter and the intermediate consignee? It is
difficult to see how a court sitting in Britain would permit the arm of
United States law to reach this situation, when the parties have not
intended American law to govern, nor to do any act in the United
States." 9 The difficulty of the Frankman case is inapplicable and the
Kleinwort case should be followed.'
The indorsee of a bill of lading takes only what it is the intention
of the parties to transfer to him by the indorsement and delivery of the
document. Generally all rights and duties of the original shipper under
the contract evidenced by the bill of lading are transferred to him.' 7 '
One duty is not to divert the goods contrary to American law. If the
indorsee then diverts the goods is there any remedy that can be pursued
against him? He can be denied export privileges by administrative
action by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce. Beyond that there is little
that can be done except possibly a suit on the breach of the condition in
the bill of lading.
If he has received the goods before diverting them, is the diversion
a breach of his contract with the exporter? Assuming the latter has
received payment for the goods, what further claim could he have over
the consignee? He has been paid, and it no longer concerns him what
happens to the goods unless the ultimate destination statement is of such
substance that diversion would go to the root of the contract. However,
169. "I may note in passing that the modern tendency is to deny extraterritorial
validity to legislation, for example, on movables situate outside the state at the time
of the legislation." Re Helbert Wagg & Co., [1956] 1 All E.R. 129, 138 (Ch.
1955).
170. See China Mut. Trading Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 1953
Am. Mar. Cas. 709, 715, aff'd, id. at 1510 (Hong Kong Sup. Ct.) (Foreign Assets
Control regulations).
171. ScRUTTON, CHARTERPARTIES 194 (16th ed. 1955).
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he may actually have some interest in future events. If it turns out
the goods are actually about to be illegally (by American law) diverted
and he had prior to shipment some suspicion that an unlawful diversion
might occur, he may find himself under investigation by the Bureau of
Foreign Commerce.' It would then be to his interest to attempt to
call a halt to the second transaction abroad. He will find himself
fortunate that English merchants prefer to deliver the goods to Eastern
European buyers at a Western port rather than directly at a port in
East Europe.'tm They will probably be sent to a free port like Antwerp
or Rotterdam where transshipment may be made. 4  There will still be
time for the United States Government to step in and attempt to stop
the diversion by use of the Battle Act agreements.
Transactions between the foreign buyer and his purchaser would
seem to be beyond the reach of American controls, except where two
important requirements can be met which depend upon the question
whether the goods to be sold are specific goods, and whether they have
come into the hands of the foreign buyer.
Where the contract is for specific goods shipped from the United
States, as would be intended where the transaction is accomplished by
a negotiation of the bill of lading, an American order preventing delivery
to the foreign buyer would raise a question of impossibility. The
American order might be accompanied by a revocation of the license
under which the goods were exported, thus annulling the legality of the
contract of export. In such a situation, the foreign buyer would have
a valid defense to a suit by his purchaser for breach of contract, the
goods having been removed from the control of the parties by govern-
mental action.t 5
The doctrine that supervening impossibility is no defense is no
longer well taken, and if the parties have not provided in their contract
for such occurrence, a court is likely to imply such a term. But in
some areas the doctrine has survived with vigor to a more recent date.
Although some of the more ancient cases are considered obsolete,176
the New York courts have held more recently that in the absence of a
provision for the contingency, a foreign embargo was not a defense to
172. See Willys-Overland Export Corp., 20 Fed. Reg. 4191 (1955).
173. See testimony in Sphinx Export Co. v. Specialist Shippers, Ltd., London
Times, May 21, 1954, p. 2, col. 7 (Q.B.).
174. See N.Y. Times, March 1, 1954, p. 1, col. 7; Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on East-West Trade, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1954); S. REP'. No. 944, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1951).
175. Cf. McNAm, LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 304 (3d ed. 1948).
176. Sjoerds v. Luscombe, 16 East. 201, 104 Eng. Rep. 1065 (K.B. 1812);
Blight v. Page, 2 Bos. & Pul. 295, 127 Eng. Rep. 163 (C.P. 1801). See ScauTroN,
CHARTEPARTIEs 13-14 (16th ed. 1955).
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an action for breach of contract. In Tweedie Trading Co. v. James
P. McDonald Co.' 7 a federal court held a carrier could recover from the
charterer on a contract to transport laborers from Barbados to Panama
even though the Barbados government had prohibited the embarkation
of laborers.
The better view should be that an occurrence of this type ends
the contract. When a ship arrived in port, but the local authorities
refused to permit its cargo to be landed, the court viewed this as an
impossibility on both sides. The ship could not land the cargo; the
consignee could not send lighters to receive itY
9
If American law were the proper law, or New York law (as lex
loci contractus) governed, a British court would apply that law. It
would then be clear that the contract would be illegal and unenforceable
by its proper law. However, the bill of lading does not express this
contract of sale but is merely a document of title. The buyer becomes
duty bound to adhere to the terms of the bill of lading but he does not
owe this duty to his seller, the importer. American law would not
be the proper law of their contract.
The impossibility described would arise from the assumption of
control of the goods by a government. This is not seen to be too
different from the cases involving requisition, although here the govern-
ment is not assuming control in order to use the goods itself, but to
prevent the goods being used to its detriment. The importer should be
excused from liability if delivery of the specific goods is prevented by the
United States. °80 A distinction can be made if it is shown the im-
porter was aware that this sale might arouse the ire of the United States;
the importer, it could be said, entered the contract knowing the goods
might not arrive because of government action, and therefore the risk
of such occurrence should be on him.""'
177. Vanetta Velvet Corp. v. Kakunaka & Co., 256 App. Div. 341, 10 N.Y.S2d
270 (1939); Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Hoffman-La Roche Chem. Works, 178 App.
Div. 855, 166 N.Y. Supp. 179 (1917); Richards & Co. v. Wreschner, 156 N.Y.
Supp. 1054 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 174 App. Div. 484, 158 N.Y. Supp. 1129 (1916).
178. 114 Fed. 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1902).
179. Ford v. Cotesworth, L.R. 5 Q.B. 544 (Ex. 1870); cf. Cunningham v.
Dunn, 3 C.P.D. 443 (1878).
180. See Ross T. Smyth & Co. v. W. N. Lindsay, Ltd., [1953] 2 All E.R.
1064 (Q.B.).
181. Cf. Simeon v. Bazett, 2 M. & S. 94, 105 Eng. Rep. 317 (K.B. 1813),
aff'd sub norn. Bazett v. Meyer, 5 Taunt. 824, 128 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ex. 1814);
K. C. Sethia, Ltd. v. Partabmull Rameshwar, [1950] 1 All E.R. 51 (C.A. 1949),
aff'd, [1951] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 89 (H.L.). If both parties were aware of the
risk, it would depend upon whom the parties intended to take the risk. Where
neither party was aware that a Portuguese export license was required, the House
of Lords held the risk was on the British seller as only he knew the Portuguese
supplier. A. V. Pound & Co. v. M. W. Hardy & Co., [1956] 1 All E.R. 639
(H.L.).
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The contract may, however, be for unascertained rather than
specific goods. The foreign importer may have in mind a shipment for
which he has already contracted, but the contract with his purchaser
does not refer to these particular goods and merely mentions the
commodity involved. Will it make any difference if it is understood the
goods are to be of American origin? ...
Both parties may know that the particular commodity can be ob-
tained only from the United States, or the contract may specify "Ameri-
can" goods. If the commodity is then placed on the Positive List in the
United States, it would be relevant whether the prohibition was to go
into effect immediately or whether there was a period of grace."8  If
the latter were true, the foreign importer would have to show that he
had used his best efforts to obtain the goods before the period expired,
and if not successful, that he had applied for but could not obtain a
validated license. Even if the prohibition were immediate, he would
still have to show he could not obtain the license. In Ross T. Smyth &
Co. v. W. N. Lindsay, Ltd.184 export was permitted at the date of the
contract under open general license. Before the seller had entered upon
performance, the general license was revoked effective eleven days from
the date of the contract, and export after that was to be allowed only
under specific license. As the prohibition was not instantaneous, the
seller was not excused, not having shown any attempt to ship the goods
during the eleven days. Devlin, J. distinguished In re Anglo-Russian
Merchant Traders, Ltd.,'" where the prohibition was immediate. It
may be noted that if the importer's United States export privileges
were canceled after making this contract, he would be excused from
performance because the prohibition would be instantaneous and com-
plete, excluding all possibility of obtaining any license.
Where the goods are not specified as "American" and they can
be obtained elsewhere, a fact both parties are aware of, the importer is
not excused. Thus, if he has agreed to sell goods which he imports,
and a foreign embargo cuts off his supply, the fact that he would have
to pay a higher price does not excuse him from delivering domestic
182. See Nisan Simon Cohen, 22 Fed. Reg. 3134 (1957), where the purchaser
of goods of American origin was denied export privileges although he was not a
participant in the original transaction of export and was not involved in any
representations made to the Bureau of Foreign Commerce.
183. A thirty-day period of grace is permitted when a commodity is placed
upon the Positive List. 15 C.F.R. §373.65(b)(7) (Supp. 1958); see also id.
§373.70(b) (1). Some exceptions have been made, however, allowing no period of
grace.
184. [1953] 2 All E.R. 1064 (Q.B.).
185. [1917] 2 K.B. 679 (C.A.).
1959]
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product.80 Conversely, if he has agreed to sell goods to a foreign
buyer, but export of that commodity has been prohibited, he is not
excused if he can supply it from another country. 7 Neither is he
excused merely because performance of the contract becomes more
difficult or unprofitable.88
These results are perfectly equitable; it is merely another way of
saying that performance does not become impossible because one of
two possible modes of performance becomes illegal.
As the transaction becomes more remote in relation to the United
States, American export regulations will have less effect. They will
be given effect if the proper law of the contract is American law, and
the defaulting party will be protected if either he has so stipulated in
the contract or a case of impossibility or frustration can be shown. The
governmental order can be effective to prevent the goods reaching their
destination, unless the order is found to be contrary to the public policy
of the law of the forum, a doubtful result.
The right of the American party to prevent delivery on his own
initiative, however, will probably not succeed. As to contracts made
after the original exportation, a British court would probably not give
effect to these laws unless the contract evidences an intention of the
parties to be bound by them. The court could, however, apply an
exception in favor of public policy and apply domestic principles of law.
186. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Hoffman-LaRoche Chem. Works, 178 App. Div.
855, 166 N.Y. Supp. 179 (1917); accord, P. N. Gray & Co. v. Cavalliotis, 276
Fed. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd inen., 293 Fed. 1018 (2d Cir. 1923).
187. In re Anglo-Russian Merchant Traders, Ltd., [1917] 2 1.B. 679 (C.A.)
(dictum).
188. Brauer & Co. v. James Clark, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 497 (C.A.); cf.
Owners of Spanish S.S. Sebastian v. De Vizcaya, [1920] 1 K.B. 332.
